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RESTRAINTS OF TRADE AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
EDVARD P. HOmi*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Development of Antitrust Laws.
The Sherman Act' became law on July 2, 1890. Section I of the
Act condemns every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint
of interstate or foreign trade and commerce. Section 2 condemns
monopolization, attempts to monopolize and conspiracies to monopo-
lize any part of interstate or foreign trade and commerce. The
penalty for violation of either section is a fine not exceeding $5,000
or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both. The Attorney
General is authorized to enforce the law by criminal or civil pro-
ceedings, or both. Any person who suffers.damages as a result of
a violation of the Sherman Act may sue the guilty parties and re-,
cover treble damages.
In the minds of many, the beginning of the Sherman Act enforce-
ment is associated with the advent of President Theodore Roosevelt
,a decade later. This view is supported by a rather interesting
chain of events during the intervening period. In the Knight case,2
decided in 1894, the Supreme Court held that due to its intrastate
natllre manufacturing could not be reached under the Sherman Act
-and this, despite the fact that the defendants represented an in-
tegrated combination contnolling 98%o of the sugar refining industry
in the United States. The effect of this case on Sherman Act en-
forcement is typified by the reports of Attorney General Harmon to
President Cleveland to the effect that the Sherman Act was unen-
forceable against industrials.
In condemning price-fixing and other activities of rate bureaus
in the Freight Association cases,4 decided in 1897 and 1898, te
Supreme Court demonstrated that there was somethig the Sher-
man Act could Teach but did not provide a broad enough jgris-
GA.B. and LL.B. (19X9) University of South Carolina; LL.M. (1937) and S. J. D.
(1941) Georgetown University; member of the Bar of the State of South Carolina and
the Bar of the District of Columbia; currently Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General
In charge of the Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice; author of the
book "Antitrust Act and the Supreme Court' (1941).
The opinions expressed are personal and do not purport to relect the official view of
the Department of Justice.
1. 15 U. S. C. § 1, et seq.
2. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1894).
3. Rep. of Attorney General (1896) XXVii.
4. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U. S. 290 (1897);
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n., 171 U. S. 505 (1898).
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dictional basis to be of much value. However, in 1899 some life
was breathed into the Sherman Act by the decision in the Addyston
Pipe case,5 in which the Supreme Court condemned price-fixing
and allocation of customers by a loose combination of pipe manufac-
turers. Added importance was given to the Addyston Pipe case by
the classic opinion6 of Judge Taft of the Circuit Court. Despite its
importance, the Addyston Pipe case was only a partial recovery
as it was generally believed that through consolidations, holding
companies, and other integrated combinations the Sherman Act
could be avoided.
The accelerating trend toward combinations at the turn of the
century was no doubt brought about by sound business judgment
resulting from the economic conditions of the times; Improved
transportation and communications served as a stimulant. Another
stimulant was the decision in the Knight case. Such was the situa-
tion when President Theodore Roosevelt came on the scene.
On March 10, 1902, the Northern Securities case7 was filed and
on May 10, 1902 the Packers case8 was filed. The decision in the
Northern Securities case, handed down in March 1904, went far to
erase the effect of the Knight case in that the Court held that a
holding company could not control two largely parallel railroad sys-
tems. The decision in the Packers case in 1905 completed the restora-
tion of the Sherman Act as a legal weapon to undergird free en-
terprise. The highlight of the decision was Mr. Justice Holmes'
9ft-quoted definition that commerce among the $tates is not a tech-
nical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course
of business.
President Roosevelt's bold action in putting life into antitrust
enforcement cannot be minimized. However, it is surprising that
President Taft has not generally been given his due. The simple
fact is that in one-half the time he filed twice as many cases under
the Sherman Act as President Roosevelt did. Moreover, he con-
tinued to evidence his strong faith in the Act in his opinions and votes
as Chief Justice of the United States.
In 1911, the Supreme Court decided that the Oil trust 9 and the
Tolbacco trust 0 should be dissolved. Added importance was given
to the Standard Oil case by the adoption by the Supreme Court of
the rule of reason which, in brief, is that while the Sherman Act in
5. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211 (1899).
6. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
7. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
8. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905).
9. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911).
10. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S.- 106 (1911).
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language condemned every restraint, in fact it condemned only un-
reasonable restraints. In the Freight Association cases, mentioned
above, the Supreme Court had bitterly debated and rejected the rule
of reason. It has been stated more than once that antitrust decisions
prior to the announcement of the rule of reason are of little value.
One unanticipated result of the announcement of the rule of rea-
son was to create a strong feeling that the Sherman Act had been
weakened through vagueness and, therefore, it would be more diffi-
cult to enforce. In response to this feeling, on September 26, 1914,
upon the recommendation of President Wilson, the Federal Trade
Commission Act11 was adopted. "Unfair methods of competition"
were condemned with a view to supplementing the Sherman Act by
reaching incipient violations.
Enactment of the Clayton Act12 followed on October 15, 1914.
Section 2 of that Act, aimed at price discrimination, sprang from
the continued public fear and hatred of price manipulation. Sec-
tion 3, relating to tie-in clauses and requirement contracts, to a cer-
tain extent was prompted by the dismissal of the indictment in
the Winslow case1 3 which involved the leasing system of United
Shoe Machinery Corporation. Sections 7 and 8, aimed at mergers
and interlocking directorates, were brought about by the public feel-
ing that the trusts still represented too great a concentration of
economic power. In 1936, Section 2 of the Clayton Act was amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act14 in an attempt to better the position
of the small merchant in meeting the competition of the chain stores
which were rapidly being established and expanded. In 1950, Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act was amended15 to reach mergers through
acquisition of assets and broaden this Section's scope.
In 1937, the Sherman Act was amended by the Miller-Tydings
Act 16 so as to legalize resale price maintenance in interstate com-
merce where a resale price maintenance law existed in the state of
resale. This firming up of the price structure was brought about
by the opponents of cut-rate stores. In 1952, the McGuire Act
17
was adopted in order to require non-signers of resale price agree-
ments to follow the prices established by the manufacturer for whole-
salers once such a contract had been entered into with a merchant
in the state of resale.
11. 15 U. S. C. § 44, et seq.
12. Id., § 12, et seq.
13. United States v. Sidney W. Winslow, 227 U. S. 202 (1913).
14. 15 U. S. C. § 13, et seq.
15. Id., § 13a.
16. Id., § 1, as amended.
17. Id.,§ 45, as amended.
Vol. 6
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In 1938, the Wheeler-Lea amendment18 broadened Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act. Prior to this amendment the
Act had prohibited only "unfair methods of competition," and it
was then necessary to show that there was "competition" which
would be affected by the unfair method. The amended language
also prohibited "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" and now most
of the deceptive practice cases are brought under this language and
in such cases the Commission can proceed directly to protect the
consumers from deception without regard to whether competition
is involved and without regard to whether competition has been
injured.
The Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, in addition to broadening Section
5, added specific provisions to the Federal Trade Commission Act
concerning food, drug, and cosmetics. The Federal Trade Commis-
sion also has duties under the Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939,19
the Trade-Mark Act of 1946,20 and the Fur Products Labeling Act
effective in 1952.21 However, these Acts are of narrow scope and
the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Clay-
ton Act may be regarded as the basic antitrust laws.
B. Interrelation of Acts Involved.
All violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act generally violate
Section 1. In the Sherman Act "in restraint of" means in or affect-
ing interstate or foreign commerce. However, in the Federal Trade
Commission Act only activities "in" such commerce can be reached.
The Pacific Paper Trade Association case22 contains a good discus-
sion of what constitutes interstate commerce as applied to the Federal
Trade Commission Act in conspiracy cases. Aside from this juris-
dictional difference, all violations of the Sherman Act violate Sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Federal Trade
Commission Act also reaches (1) incipient violations of the Sher-
man Act (which the Sherman Act cannot reach) and (2) the un-
lawful trade practices of one person (which the Sherman Act cannot
reach). Therefore, the vast majority of situations can be reached
by both the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Accordingly, cases under these Acts will be discussed together ex-
cept with respect to unilateral illegal trade practices under the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
18. Ibid.
19. Id., §§ 66-685.
20. Id., §§ 1051-1127.
21. Id., §§ 69-69j.
22. Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific Trade Ass'n., 273 U. S. 52 (1927).
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1953], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol6/iss2/3
SOUTH CAROIINA LAW QUARThRLY
C. Interrelation of Enforcement Agencies.
The Antitrust Division today normally has a staff of 300 lawyers,
30 economists, and 8 field offices. The Federal Trade Commission to-
day normally has a staff of 350 lawyers, 35 economists, and 6 field of-
fices. Close liaison is maintained between the Antitrust Division and
the Federal Trade Commission in order to prevent duplication of ac-
tivities.
Antitrust Division investigations aside from grand jury investiga-
tions are made by the FBI leading to civil or criminal proceedings,
or both, following customary judicial procedures. However, all civil
cases brought by the Department of Justice can be appealed by either
party directly to the Supreme Court inder the Expediting Act of
1910.23
Federal Trade Commission investigations are conducted by its
on staff. Complaints are issued by and hearings are held before
the Commission. If a cease and desist order is issued by the Com-
mission upon the completion of a hearing, the defendant may appeal
to the appropriate Court of Appeals and then either side may apply
to the Supreme Court for certiorari. If no appeal is taken a penalty
for violation of the cease and desist order is automatically imposed
after sixty days. If a litigated judgment is violated, the Govern-
ment may proceed in court in the nature of a contempt to impose a
penalty of $5,000 for each violation. The Federal Trade Commission
and the Antitrust Division have concurrent jurisdiction in the en-
forcement of Sections 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act.




The initial cases2 4 instituted under the Sherman Act, which in-
clude the first case2 5 to reach the Supreme Court, were directed at
price-fixing. The Supreme Court declared the practice to be illegal.
In the Addyston Pipe case the Supreme Court did more than mere-
ly condemn price-fixing. It affirmed the classic opinion by Judge
Taft. Judge Taft explained with great care that no justification
could be found in the reasonableness of the prices or economic con-
ditions facing the industry. However, over the years defendants
attempted to justify price-fixing on the ground of reasonableness.
23. 15 U. S. C. § 28.
24. United States v. Jellico Mt. Coal & Coke Co., 46 Fed. 432 (1891).
25. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U. S. 290 (1897).
[Vol. 6
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Finally, in the Trenton Potteries case,26 and in the Socony-Vacuum
case,27 with even greater elaboration and emphasis, the Supreme
Court declared that price-fixing is illegal per se. The Court in
the latter case stated :28
. , . Any combination which tampers with price structures is
engaged in an unlawful activity. Even though the members
of the price-fixing group were in no position to control the mar-
ket, to the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices
they would be directly interfering with the free play of market
forces.
2. Vertical Price-fixing.
In the Dr. Miles Medical case29 the Supreme Court laid down
the doctrine that a manufacturer and the wholesalers and retailers
of its products could not agree on resale prices, even though the pro-
duct be made by a secret process. Competition between vendors of
the manufacturer's product would have been destroyed, and the cost
to the consumer made higher, if the agreement had been permitted
to stand. The Court icould see no reason for differentiating this
type of agreement fromp any other type of agreement fixing prices.
A situation involving the distribution of resale price lists by a
mantffacturer, the urging by the manufacturer that retailers comply
with such lists, and the refusal of the manufacturer to deal with
retailers who refused to follow the suggested prices was presented
to the Court for consideration in the Colgate case.80 The Court heli
that this was not a conmbination in restraint of trade within the doc-
trine of the Miles case. The Court grounded its decision on the
right of a trader to sell to whom he pleases and under conditions he
chooses.
The Colgate case was somewhat qualified by the decision in the
Beechnut Packing case,31 in which the Court held that while a seller
may refuse to sell to those who will not resell his products at a fixed
price, to go beyond refusal by attempting to police customers through
agreements, etc. to see that such a price is maintained was a violation
of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and an unfair
method of competition.
26. United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U. S. 392 (1927).
27. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940).
28. Id., at 221.
29. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. J. D. Park & Sons, 220 U. S. 373 (1911).
30. United States v. Colgate Co., 250 U. S. 300 (1919); -
31. Federal Trade Commission v. Beechnut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441- (1922).
1953]
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In the General Electric Company case,3 2 the Supreme Court held
that the Miles case did not control a bona fide agency system.
In the Kiefer-Stewart case,38 the Supreme Court held that agree-
ments to fix maximum resale prices no less than those to fix mini-
mum prices crippled the freedom of traders and thereby restrained
their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment. The
Court also rejected respondents' contention that they were "mere
instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-merchandizing unit" and,
therefore, it was impossible for them to have conspired in violation
of the Sherman Act. The Court stated :8 "The rule is especially
applicable where, as here, respondents hold themselves out as com-
petitors."
3. Vertical Price-fixing Under The Miller-Tydings Act and The
McGuire Act.
The Miller-Tydings Act,35 which amended both Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act, provides that
vertical minimum price-fixing contracts shall not be in Violation of
the antitrust laws or the Federal Trade Commission Act when such
contracts involve (a) trade-marked or branded commodities, (b)
which are in competition with other similar commodities, and (c)
when such contracts are valid under the state law of the place of re-
sale. Forty-five states have such laws, differing in detail, but all per-
mitting the making of vertical contracts establishing minimum resale
prices and binding persons not parties to the contracts.
a. Attempt at horizontal price-fixing under the Miller-Tydings Act.
The Frankfort Distilleries case 6 involved an agreement among
producers, middlemen, and retailers "to adopt a single course in
making contracts of sale and to boycott all others who would not
adopt the same course." The Supreme Court held the combination
illegal as not coming within the Miller-Tydings exemption, which
expressly provides that it shall not apply to horizontal agreements.
b. Attempts at vertical price-fixing for commodity in successive
stages of production.
In the Univis Lens case37 a manufacturer of lens blanks entered
into contracts to fix the price at which the finished lenses were sold
32. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476 (1926). See Also
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U. S. 287 (1948).
33. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U. S. 211 (1951).
34. Id., at 215.
35. 15 U. S. C. § 1, as amended.
36. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U. S. 293 (1945).
37. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241 (1942).
[Vol. 6
7
Hodges: Restraints of Trade and Unfair Competition
Published by Scholar Commons, 1953
193ZTRNT ov TRAD4
by its licensee. The Court held that the Miller-Tydings Act did
not save this price-fixing activity from violating the Sherman Act,
that there is nothing "to indicate that [the Miller-Tydings] provisions
were to be so applied to products manufactured in successive stages
by different processors that the first would be free to control the
price of his successors." Univis was not the manufacturer of the
commodity sold and the licensee, in fact, did not Teseil.
In condemning the system of eye-glass lenses distribution in the
Bausch & Lomb case, the Court said :88
We think that where a distribution system exists, prior to
the making of such price maintenance contracts, which is illegal
because of unallowable price fixing contracts and where that
illegality necessarily persists in part because a portion of the
resales are not covered by the "Fair Trade" contracts ..... sub-
sequent price maintenance contracts, otherwise valid, should be
cancelled, along with the invalid arrangements, in order that
the ground may be cleansed effectually from the vice of the
former illegality.
The above cases demonstrate that the Miller-Tydings Act will
not insulate agreements among competitors in restraint of trade, nor
does it permit vertical price-fixing of commodities which are pro-
cessed during a stage of distribution.
c. Non-signers.
The Miller-Tydings Act speaks in terms of "contracts or agree-
ments" and makes no reference to non-signers. In the Schwegmann
case89 the Supreme Court ruled that persons not parties to agree-
ments establishing minimum resale prices of commodities in inter-
state commerce are not bound by those agreements, even though the
state of resale does have a law binding non-signers.
Following the Schwegmann case, the McGuire Act,40 permitting
the binding of non-signers, was enacted in 1952 as an amendment
to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. We now
have the anomaly of, on the one hand, the Miller-Tydings Act, as
an amendment to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, permitting re-
sale price maintenance contracts but not permitting the binding of
non-signers, and, on the other hand, the McGuire Act, as an amend-
38. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U. S. 707, 724 (1944).
39. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951).
40. 15 U. S. C. § 45, as amended.
1953]
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ment to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Comnission Act, permit-
ting the binding of non-signers of these contracts.
The Supreme Court has recently denied revieW in two cases
dealing with this subject which will now be discussed.
The Grayson-Robinson case 41 arose under the Georgia Fair Trade
Act42 of 19a7. The Stipreme Court of that State held that, since
the state law provided for the binding of non-signers, it was incon-
sistent with the Sherman Act at the time of passage and, therefcire,
was invalid; that it accordingly offended the supremacy clause as
well as the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, and that
provision of the Georgia Constitution which declares that legisla-
tive acts violative of the U. S. Constitution are void.
The State Court also declared that the State Act offended the
State Constitutional provision that "no person shali be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, except by dtte process of Taw.'1
The United States Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of
certiorari on October 12, 1953.4s
Shortly after enactment of the McGuire Act, another attempt
was made to require Schwegmann to abide by the Louisiana Fair
Trade Law and not to sell below "Fair Trade' prices even though
he was a non-signer of a resale price maintenance contract. The
District Court44 granted an injunction against Schwegmann and
the Court of Appeals45 affirmed in a 2-1 decision, denying defen-
dant's challenge to the constitutionality of the state law and of the
McGuire Act.
The Court of Appeals relied on Old Dearborn Distributing case46
which had upheld the constitutionality of state fair trade acts as
legitimately protecting the good will of the manufacturer or trade-
mark owner.
The moving party in this case was the trade-mark owner and the
Court withheld decision on whether the result would be different
if a distributor (not the owner of a trade-mark, to the ownership
of which good will accrued) were seeking enforcement of the law.
On October 19, 1953, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
this case also 47
41. Grayson-Robinson Stores v. Oneida, Ltd., 209 Ga. 613, 75 S. E. 2d 161
(1953).
42. Ga. L. 1937, p. 800, § 1, et seq.
43. Oneida, Ltd. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, 74 S. Ct 39 (U. S. 1953).
44. Schwegmann Brothers v. Eli Lilly & Co., 109 F. Supp. 269 (E. D. La.
1953).
45. Schivegmann Brothers v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 F. 2d 788 (5th Cir. 1953).
46. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U. S.
183 (1936).
47. Schwegmann Brothers v. Eli Lilly & Co., 74 S. Ct 71 (U. S. 1953).
[Vol 6
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The Court's reservation in this case may turn out to be a signifi-
cant one. It appears that very often the impetus for enforcement
of "fair trade" prices comes from retailers or distributors rather
than from a manufacturer. If a distributor is not able to persuade
a manufacturer to undertake enforcement, the Schwegmann case
does not settle the question whether the distributor has the right
to sue to protect the manufacturer's good will.
Another interesting question is whether other state courts may
follow the Georgia decision and hold pre-McGuire Act state fair
trade laws invalid.
4. Unilateral Price Discrimination. (Robinson-Patnan Act)
The Robinson-Patman Act4 8 amending as it does the Clayton
Act, prohibits discrimination in price (a) where the effect of the
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly; or (b) where the effect may be to injure,
prevent or destroy competition. It further prohibits other classes
of discriminations not directly involving price itself; for example, the
furnishing of services or other facilities to customers on terms not
proportionately equal.
The Act by prohibiting price discrimination endeavors to prevent
this burden or disadvantage which otherwise would occur when the
recipient assumes the role of seller in the next step of distribution.
The area of competition to which the Robinson-Patman Act is di-
rected is competition at any level of the distributive process which
is affected whenever a buyer is a recipient of a discriminatory price.
To convert a "price differential" into a "price discrimination" un-
der the Robinson-Patman Act, it must (a) be in commerce, (b) re-
late to a commodity, (c) involve parties entitled to equal treatment,
and (d) have the prescribed injurious effect upon competition.
This is not to say, however, that all price differentials which con-
tain all of the elements of a price discrimination are unlawful. In
enacting the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress provided for certain
so-called justifiable discriminations which may be found in the pro-
visos following the price discrimination of Section 2(a). For ex-
ample, it is an absolute defense to a charge of price discrimination
for a seller to prove that its price differential makes only due allow-
ance for differences in costs or for price changes made in response
to changing market conditions. In addition, the Congress made pro-
vision in Section 2(b) for justifiable use of price discrimination in
individual situations. This relates to the meeting of a lower price
offered by a competing seller.
48. 15 U. S. C. § 13a.
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This right of the seller under Section 2(b) to meet in good faith
an equally low price of a competitor was considered by the Supreme
Court in Corn Products Refining Co. case 49 and in the Cement In-
stitute case.50 While the Court did not sustain the seller's defense
in either case, it recognized the relevance of the evidence in support
of that defense. The decision in each case was based on the insuffici-
ency of the seller's evidence to establish its defense but not upon
the inadequacy of the defense as a matter of law.
In 1950, the Supreme Court again considered the effect of Sec-
tion 2(b) in the Standard Oil Co. case.51 The Federal Trade Com-
mission there maintained that even though the price differential may
have been made in good faith to meet the lower price of a competi-
tor, it does not constitute a defense in the face of affirmative proof
that the effect of the differential was to injure, destroy and prevent
competition.
However, the Court rejected this argument interpreting the pro-
viso of Section 2(b) as providing the equivalent justification for a
price differential as the proviso of Section 2(a).
In connection with the question of price discrimination under a
basing point situation, it is interesting to note that the prohibition
of Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act applies to discriminatory
prices, whether or not the purchasers are in the same locality. In
the Corn Products Co. case the Court pointed out that there was
nothing in the words of the statute which would support such a dis-
tinction and that the statutory purpose (to prevent injuries to com-
petition through price discrimination) would preclude any such dis-
tinction. The purchasers were found to be in competition with each
other even though in different localities.
B. Distribution.
1. Restriction of Distribution Facilities.
Because of the inherent monopolistic characteristics of common car-
riers, particularly railroads, the courts have been generally quick
to condemn combinations among such carriers to restrain trade un-
less the combination's activity falls within a specific statutory ex-
emption. Thus, in the Trans-Missouri Freight Association52 and the
Joint Traffic Association53 cases, the Supreme Court found viola-
49. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U. S. 726
(1945).
50. Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948).
51. Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U. S. 231 (1951).
52. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U. S. 290 (1897).
53. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n., 171 U. S. 505 (1898).
[Vol. 6
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tions of the Sherman Act in the attempts of railroads to control
competition through the organization of associations which had as
their primary objective the fixing of rates.
In the Northern Securities case54 a different device to achieve the
elimination of competition between competing carriers was presented.
In that case, the stockholders of the Great Northern Railway Com-
pany and the Northern Pacific Railway Company organized a hold-
ing company to which was transferred the controlling stock of both
carriers. The Court held that by this device competition between
the two railroads was destroyed and thereby a restraint of trade was
effected.
In the Union Pacific Railroad case,5 5 the Supreme Court was quick
to condemn a similar result which was achieved through the pur-
chase of one railroad of a controlling stock interest in a competing
line.
Similarly, the Supreme Court applied the Union Pacific doctrine in
the Southern Pacific Company case5 6 where it refused to permit the
defendant to hold controlling stock in another line despite the fact
that the two railroads had been operated as a unified system for
fourteen years.
The Supreme Court was equally alert to strike down restraints on
transportation which were effectuated by monopolizing terminal fa-
cilities. In the Terminal Railway Association case, 57 the Supreme
Court held that the acquisition of control by a group of railroads of
the terminal facilities of St. Louis would violate the Sherman Act
unless all the carriers serving that City were permitted to partici-
pate in the control since, otherwise, the Court recognized that non-
participating carriers would no longer be in a position to success-
fully serve St. Louis. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted
that ordinarily railroad companies could combine their terminal fa-
cilities and exclude other carriers therefrom without violating the
Sherman Act since the excluded railroads could usually build their
own terminals. Here, however, because of St. Louis' peculiar topo-
graphical conditions, such action was impossible.
A further development in the application of the Sherman Act to
common carriers was presented in the Reading Company case 58 where
a combination of railroad and coal companies were charged with, and
found guilty of, restraining the sale and transportation of coal. The
54. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
55. United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 226 U. S. 61 (1912).
56. United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U. S. 214 (1922).
57. United States v. Terminal R. Association, 224 U. S. 383 (1912).
58. United States v. Reading Co., 226 U. S. 324 (1912).
1953]
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six defendant carriers contrclled the only means of transportation
between the Eastern Pennsylvania anthracite fields and tidewater
from which the coal was distributed by rail and water; and, they,
together with the coal companies which they controlled, produced
and sold 75% of the total annual supply of anthracite. The defen-
dants achieved the restraint by working together to preclude from
the district prospective transportation competition and by shutting
out the coal of independent operators from competition at tidewater
with their own coal. In their efforts to secure this second objective,
the defendants, pursuant to an agreement among themselves, pro-
ceeded to enter into contracts with the independent coal producers
under the terms of which they would buy the entire output of the
latter. The contracts were to extend not only for the life of the
mines presently in operation but were to be extended to mines sub-
sequently opened. With respect to these contracts, the Supreme
Court stated :9
In the instant case the extent of the control over the limited
supply of anthracite coal by means of the great proportion there-
tofore owned or controlled by the defendant companies, and
the extent of the control acquired over the independent output
which constituted the only competing supply, affords evidence
of an intent to suppress that competition and of a purpose to
unduly restrain the freedom of production, transportation and
sale of the article at tide-water markets.
In a subsequent case60 brought against the Reading Company, the
Supreme Court found that the holding company was still violating
the Sherman Act by continuing in active control of two competing
interstate commerce carriers and two coal companies, thus, effective-
ly suppressing all competition between the four companies and pool-
ing their earnings. Accordingly, the Court directed the dissolution
of the combination.
2. Channelization of Distribution.
In the Eastern States Lumber Association case,61 the Government
was successful in having enjoined a combination of retail lumber
dealers which had entered into a conspiracy to prevent wholesale
dealers in the Middle Atlantic area from selling directly to consum-
ers of lumber by having their trade association circulate among the
retailers a list of all wholesalers who sold directly to consumers. In
59. Id., at 370.
60. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26 (1920).
61. Eastern States Lumber Ass'n. v. United States, 234 U. S. 600 (1914).
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this case, the Supreme Court recognized that the practical effect of
the defendants' program was to cause retailers to refrain from buying
from non-cooperating wholesalers and that, therefore, the combina
tion was illegal even though there was no formal agreement among
the retailers not to buy from those wholesalers whose names appeared
on the circulated list. The law of this case is still in full force to-
day. Therefore, any combination among a business group to require
that goods be sold through particular channels exclusively is illegal
and in violation of the Sherman Act.
3. Allocation of Marketing Areas and of Customers.
Competitors who are fearful of the consequences of unrestricted
price competition and desirous of establishing competitive stability
may seek to accomplish their purpose by allocating markets. Sharing
the market may consist in allocating fixed percentages of the avail-
able business to each producer, dividing sales territory on a geo-
graphical basis, or alloting customers to each seller. All such ar-
rangements are illegal.
Thus, in the Addyston Pipe case, 62 which involved a combina-
tion among six manufacturers of cast iron pipe, the defendants, by
agreement and through the instrumentality of an association, estab-
lished a threefold division of their sales territory in only one of
which free competition was to exist. In one of the other market
areas the cities were allocated to particular members of the combina-
tion who were required to sell at prices fixed by the group and pay
bonuses to the association which were, in turn, to be distributed to
the membership. In the remaining territory each contract was allo-
cated to that member of the combination who would agree to pay
the largest bonus for division among the members of the association.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,63 in an opinion written
by judge Taft, and affirmed by the Supreme Court, held that division
of markets was illegal under the Sherman Act.
Any doubt as to the illegality of the division of domestic or world
markets by agreement was put to rest in the National Lead Company
case64 where the Supreme Court held that allocation of markets to
members of a combination violated the Sherman Act regardless of
prevalent economic conditions which were relied upon to justify the
practice. The Supreme Court there affirmed the lower court's find-
ing that the defendants had participated in an "international cartel"
62. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211 (1899).
63. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
64. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U. S. 319 (1947).
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in restraint of interstate and foreign commerce in titanium products
through the pooling of patents and the allocation of markets in viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Similarly, in the Tiviken Roller Bearing Company case,65 the Su-
preme Court found that the defendant, a domestic corporation, had
violated the Sherman Act by conspiring with a British corporation
and a French corporation, in each of which it had a financial interest,
to restrain interstate and foreign commerce in the manufacture and
sale of bearings. In this case it was found that under agreement be-
tween them the corporation had allocated trade territories among
themselves; fixed prices on products of one sold in the territory of
the others; cooperated to protect each other's markets and to eliminate
outside competition; and participated in cartels to restrict imports
to, and exports from, the United States.
4. Boycotts.
The earliest Sherman Act decision dealing with a boycott is the
Montague case,6 6 where an association of wholesalers and manufac-
turers in its by-laws provided that no dealer member should buy
from any manufacturer who was not a member of the association
or sell for less than list price to anyone not a member, and that manu-
facturers who sold to non-members should forfeit their membership.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the formation
of the association and its activities constituted an agreement in re-
straint of trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
Although giving little guide as to the proper approach to a boy-
cott case, the Montague decision held that a clearcut concerted re-
fusal to deal which restrained interstate commerce was a violation
of the Sherman Act.
Subsequent to the Eastern States Retail Lumber case, the Sugar
Institute6 7 and the Paramount Famous Lasky68 cases held that the
boycotting activities there involved amounted to unreasonable re-
straints of trade. None of these cases considered whether the un-
reasonableness was due to the surrounding circumstances or whether
it was due to the adoption, in and of itself, of the boycott. However,
in the Fashion Originators' Guild of America case,69 the Supreme
Court indicated that a boycott was unreasonable in itself and could
not be justified on any ground; in fact, the Supreme Court held that
no error had been committed in that case by the exclusion of evidence
65. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 593 (1951).
66. W. W. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38 (1904).
67. Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936).
68. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U. S. 30 (1930).
69. Fashion Originators Guild v. Trade Commission, 312 U. S. 457 (1941).
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offered by the defendants to prove that the practices they followed
were reasonable and necessary for the protection of all members of
their industry against the evils growing out of the pirating of original
fashion designs. In the Fashion Originators' Guild case, the re-
straint consisted of a boycott by dress manufacturers of retailers
who patronized style pirates. These manufacturers sought to achieve
their aim by agreeing to refuse to sell to manufacturers and retailers
of garments who dealt in the pirated copies or who would not agree
to refrain from selling them. In holding this activity illegal the
Supreme Court stated :70
. .. And among the many respects in which the Guild's plan
runs contrary to the policy of the Sherman Act are these: it
narrows the outlets to which garment and textile manufacturers
can sell and the sources from which retailers can buy (Montague
& Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, 45; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co.
v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 48-49); subjects all retailers
and manufacturers who decline to comply with the Guild's
program to an organized boycott (Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers' Assn. v. United States, 234 U. S. 600, 609-611);
takes away the freedom of action of members by requiring each
to reveal to the Guild the intimate details of their individual
affairs (United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S.
371, 389); and has both as its necessary tendency and as its
purpose and effect the direct suppression of competition from
the sale of unregistered textiles and copied designs (United
States v. American Linseed Oil Co., supra, 262 U. S. at 389).
In addition to all this, the combination is in reality an extra-
governmental agency, which prescribes rules for the regula-
tion and restraint of interstate commerce, and provides extra-
judicial tribunals for determination and punishment of violations,
and thus "trenches upon the power of the national legislature
and violates the statute." Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States, 175 U. S. 211, 242.
Subsequently, in the International Salt Company case, the Supreme
Court cited the Fashion Originators' Guild Company case in holding
that "it is unreasonable per se to foreclose competitors from any sub-
stantial market."
7 1
In subsequent cases the Supreme Court has indicated that it is
illegal for any business group to engage in a boycott. Thus, in the
70. Id., at 465.
71. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 396 (1947).
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American Medical Association case,72 it was held that it was a vio-
lation of the Sherman Act for the defendants to conspire to prevent
Group Health (a non-profit corporation organized by Government
employees to provide medical care and hospitalization on a pre-pay-
ment basis) from functioning by conspiring to coerce physicians
from accepting employment under Group Health and by restraining
hospitals from affording facilities for the care of patients of Group
Health's physicians. The Supreme Court noted that the fact that
the defendants were physicians and medical organizations was of no
significance if the purpose and effect of their conspiracy was to im-
pose a restraint on the business of Group Health.
In the Associated Press case,73 the Supreme Court extended the
prohibition against boycotting activities to the newsgathering field.
In that case, the Supreme Court held that the by-laws of the Asso-
ciated Press, a cooperative association engaged in gathering and dis-
tributing news in interstate and foreign commerce, violated the Sher-
man Act in that it prohibited service of AP news to non-members,
prohibited members from furnishing spontaneous news to non-mem-
bers, and empowered members to block membership applications of
competitors. Likewise, it has been held in the Allen Bradley Com-
pany case74 that boycotting activities by labor unions constitute a
violation of the Sherman Act if the union acts in a combination with
non-labor groups to create business monopolies and to control the
marketing of goods in interstate commerce. In the Women's Sports-
wear Manufacturers Association case,7 5 the Supreme Court reiter-
ated the ruling of the Allen Bradley case.
C. Trade Associations.
While consistently recognizing that there is a useful and legiti-
mate place for the trade association in the business world, the courts
have unhesitatingly condemned association activities which are in effect
devices to enable the membership to impose restraints on commerce
through price-fixing, price-stabilization, boycotting or division of mar-
kets. However, there is a twilight zone of association activity which
separates the clearly legal from the definitely illegal and this is found
in the collection and dissemination of detailed statistics among the
membership, the adoption of uniform accounting procedures, and
credit bureau functions. If these and similar activities are nothing
72. American Medical Ass'n. v. United States, 317 U. S. 519 (1943).
73. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945).
74. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, 325 U. S. 797 (1945).
75. United States v. Women's Sportswear Manufacturers Association, 336
U. S. 460 (1949).
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more than a subterfuge to fix or stabilize prices or cause the associa-
tion membership to refuse to deal with third parties other than upon
the terms mutually agreed upon by the association, they unquestion-
ably fall within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.
1. Collection and Dissemination of Statistics and Related Activities.
In those instances where a trade association is used as a vehicle
to apprise in detail each member of the competition which is being
provided by its competitors in the association (the so-called "open
competition" plan), then the courts have found it necessary to scru-
tinize the entire plan in order to determine whether it has resulted
in the elimination of competition or is likely to do so. In other
words, the legality of the activities can only be assessed in such in-
stances in light of their total effect on interstate commerce. Par-
enthetically, it should be noted that frequently Where the association
is found to be engaged in the collection and dissemination of de-
tailed statistical information, it is also urging the membership to
follow a uniform system of accounting in order to make the statistics
more meaningful. Therefore, the legality of a uniform system of
accounting is considered in the context of the entire association
program of gathering and distributing information. Of course, if
the cost accounting system is found just to be a means of arriving
at uniform prices, it would be illegal as a means to obtain a goal
which is prohibited by the Sherman law.
One of the principal criteria which the courts have seemingly re-
sorted to in determining the illegality of the so-called "open competi-
tion" plan is whether the detailed statistics which are collected and
disseminated among the association membership are available to the
public who buys from or sells to the individual members of the plan.
Where the information is kept from the public, it would appear that
the courts are more prone to find that the statistical activities of the
association are more than a convenient means to enable the member-
ship to stabilize prices, and consequently unlawful.
The American Column & Lumber Co. case76 was the first "open
competition" case to come before the Supreme Court. Some 365
hardwood lumber mills, whose production amount to 1/3 of the
total national production, participated in the plan. The most de-
tailed statistics were collected from and disseminated to the member-
ship and such information was unavailable to the public. Thus, the
members were required to submit daily sales and shipping reports;
monthly production and stock reports; price lists; and, all price
76. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 (1921).
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changes as soon as made. The association distributed to the mem-
bers monthly production summaries, weekly sales and shipment re-
ports, monthly stock reports, monthly summaries of price lists, and
market report letters analyzing production and sales and general
market conditions. At frequent meetings of the membership, infor-
mation was elicited as to future production and the views of the mem-
bers as to market conditions. There was also a provision made for
inspection of the books of the individual members by association
employees in order to check on the accuracy of the reports. Thus,
under this plan each member was thoroughly informed with respect
to the minutest detail of the business operations of the other members.
The Supreme Court held that the plan violated the Sherman Act
even though there was no formal agreement by the membership as
to their future conduct either with respect to production or prices.
This was unnecessary, for the Court pointed out :7
The sanctions of the plan obviously are, financial interest,
intimate personal contact, and business honor, all operating
under the restraint of exposure of what would be deemed bad
faith and of trade punishment by powerful rivals.
The Court further noted that the whole approach of the membership
was.78
. . . not the conduct of competitors but is so clearly that of
men united in an agreement, express or implied, to act together
and pursue a common purpose under a common guide that, if
it did not stand confessed a combination to restrict production
and increase prices in interstate commerce and as, therefore, a
direct restraint upon that commerce, as we have seen that it is,
that conclusion must inevitably have been inferred from the facts
which were proved.
The second case to consider the "open competition" plan was the
American Linseed Oil Co. case7 9 and the Court again found that
the plan violated the Sherman Act. Here again detailed statistics
were gathered and disseminated without making them available to
the public. Further, the members were obliged to furnish the asso-
ciation a schedule of their prices and not to depart therefrom prior
to giving the association notice.
77. Id., at 399.
78. Id., at 410.
79. United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371 (1923).
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However, in the Maple Flooring Association case,80 the Supreme
Court found that the plan was legal. In this case it should be noted
that all of the statistics involved dealt with past and closed transac-
tions; that they were given wide publicity by being published in
trade journals and by being sent to the Department of Commerce;
and that none of the statistics which were gathered and disseminated
included current price quotations. In upholding the legality of the
plan, the Supreme Court noted that the statistics did not differ in
any essential respect from trade or business statistics which are fre-
quently gathered and publicly disseminated in numerous branches
of industry. It should be noted in this case that at association meet-
ings there were no discussions as to past or future prices.
In the companion case of the Cement Manufacturers Protective
Association,8 1 the Supreme Court, likewise, found that the "open
competition" plan was legal.
That each of these "open competition" plans must be considered
on its own peculiar facts as was observed by the Court in the Maple
Flooring case, is illustrated by the Supreme Court's opinion in the
Sugar Institute case8 2 wherein the Court recognized that, in light
of the peculiar pricing policy that had been followed by that industry
over the years, the Sherman Act was not violated even though the
members of the Institute made public announcement of future prices
and terms of sale. However, the Court' said it was unlawful for the
association to secure adherence, without deviation, to prices and terms
thus announced.
2. Uniform Credit and Arbitration Policies.
In the Paramount Famous Lasky Corporation case,83 the Supreme
Court made it crystal clear that it is unlawful for the members of
an industry to agree to deal with third parties only on terms satis-
factory to the combination. In that case, ten producers and distri-
butors of motion pictures, controlling 60o of the entire film business,
agreed to deal with the distributors only on a standard form of con-
tract pr6viding, among other things, for the arbitration of all con-
troversies. In holding that such an agreement violated the Sherman
Act, the Supreme Court stated:84
The fact that the standard exhibition contract and rules of
arbitration were evolved after six years of discussion and ex-
80. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563 (1925).
81. Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925).
82. Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936).
83. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U. S. 30 (1930).
84. Id., at 43.
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perimentation does not show that they were either normal or
reasonable regulations. That the arrangement existing between
the parties cannot be classed among 'those normal and usual
agreements in aid of trade and commerce' spoken of in Eastern
States Lumber Assn. v. United States, supra, page 612 of 234
U. S., is manifest. Certainly it is unusual, and we think it
necessarily and directly tends to destroy 'the kind of competi-
tion to which the public has long looked for protection.' United
States v. American Oil Co., supra, page 390 of 262 U. S. * * *
Again in the First National Pictures, Inc. case,8 5 the Supreme
Court declared illegal an agreement among the parties thereto to
refuse to supply motion pictures to any exhibitor who refused to
assume any contracts entered into by his predecessor with members
of the combination. Even though the defendants in that case sought
to justify their mutually agreed upon policy as affording them reason-
able protection against a practice of exhibitors evading film service
contracts by transferring their theatres, the Supreme Court held
that such justification did not constitute a valid defense to the charge
of violating the Sherman Act.
D. Unilateral Illegal Trade Practices Under The Federal Trade
Commission Act.
1. Restraints of Trade.
Many of the practices which have been termed unfair under the
Federal Trade Commission Act will be readily recognizable as being
also actionable torts. These practices are in contra-distinction to
those which we ordinarily think of as comprising violations of the
antitrust laws, that is, price-fixing, attempts to monopolize, conspira-
cies, and so forth. The next few examples concern cases which, have
been termed under the heading, interference with advantageous trade
relations.
a. Cutting off competitors' supplies or access to marketing facilities.
For example, in the case of Darling & Co.,8 6 the respondent was
a corporation engaged in the purchase of raw materials consisting
chiefly of shop fats, bones, suet, and hides, and in processing these
raw materials, and then selling the finished product. Darling & Co.
was the predominant organization in the rendering business in the
territories in which it and its subsidiary corporations operated. The
Commission found that the company engaged in, among other prac-
85. United States v. First National Pictures, Inc., 282 U. S. 44 (1930).
86. F. T. C. v. Darling & Co., 30 F. T. C. 739 (1940).
[Vol. 6
21
Hodges: Restraints of Trade and Unfair Competition
Published by Scholar Commons, 1953
RESTRAINT Ov TRADE
tices the practice of quoting a higher price for the purchase of raw ma-
terials than were justified by the trade conditions without intending to
pay such prices, but with the intention to cause injury to its competi-
tors. It also paid higher prices in those localities in which it met com-
petition for the purchase of raw materials, thus eliminating the com-
petitors' source of supply. Another practice that it entered into for
the purpose of eliminating its competitors' sources of supply was
that of making loans to butchers on condition that they sell all of
their fats, bones, suet and other offal exclusively to respondent. The
Commission found that these practices constituted unfair trade prac-
tices within the Federal Trade Commission Act and issued an order
to cease and desist.
b. Enticing away employees of competitors with the purpose and
effect of hrrassing and embarrassing such competitors; acquir-
ing confidential information unfairly; etc.
This same company, in this same case, enticed competitors' driv-
ers and solicitors, who had routes covering supply sources of raw
material, into its employ by offering higher wages. The purpose
was, of course, not to raise their standard of living but rather to
dry up the competitors' supply sources.
Where a company entices employees away from competitors for
the purpose of obtaining confidential information of the competitor,
the Commission has held this a violation of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. In the Standard Car Equipment Co. case8 7 the respon-
dent had been engaged in inducing employees of its competitors to
leave their employment for the purpose of demoralizing and breaking
down the competitive organizations. The respondent also acquired
trade secrets and confidential information of its competitors through
a former employee. The Commission ordered the respondents to
cease and desist from this employee-raiding practice. In the Allen
Sales Service case88 former employees of a company formed a com-
petitive organization. The Federal Trade Commission held that these
employees could not utilize confidential information, which they
had acquired during the period of their employment, in their new
organization.
c. Appropriating trade-mark, trade name or other values wrong-
fully.
The Federal Trade Commission has condemned the practice of
fashioning a new trade-mark or trade name for the purpose of lead-
87. F. T. C. v. Standard Car Equipment, 1 F. T. C. 144 (1918).
88. F. T. C. v. Allen Sales Services, Inc., 1 F. T. C. 459 (1919).
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ing the public to believe that the new product is the same as an older,
well-established one. In the M. G. Slocum case89 a company dis-
played the name "B-D, Basilli-Destroy" in simulation of an older
and well-established trade-mark, "B-K, Bacilli-Kil", which had been
previously registered. The Commission held that this appropriating
and reproducing of the trade-mark amounted to a violation of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.
d. Inducing breach of competitors' contracts.
Where a carburetor manufacturer induced gas station dealers al-
ready handling a competitive carburetor to cancel existing sales con-
tracts with the manufacturer of the competitive carburetor and, more-
over, sought to require them not to handle the competitive carburetor
in the future, it was held to be unfair competition under the Federal
Trade Commission Act.9 0
e. Chance merchandising schemes.
However, the Federal Trade Commission Act is not limited mere-
ly to the above easily recognizable predatory practices. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly pointed out that the Congressional purpose in
enacting the Federal Trade Commission Act was a broader one than
merely to condemn those actions which were already illegal at com-
mon law and the Sherman Act. Thus in the Keppel case91 the Su-
preme Court held that the practice of a candy manufacturer in dis-
tributing, in interstate commerce, assortments of candy through a
chance-merchandising scheme was an unfair method of competition
under the Act. In that case a candy manufacturer arranged an as-
sortment of penny candy so as to include a few pieces that had
concealed within its wrapper a single penny, so that the purchasers
of those particular pieces of candy received back the amount of the
purchase price. The Supreme Court, in holding that this practice
was violative of the Federal Trade Commission Act, pointed out that
the mere fact that competing candy manufacturers or distributors
may adopt the merchandising-by-chance scheme does not immunize
the practice. The Court said:92
... a trader may not, by pursuing a dishonest practice, force
his competitors to choose between its adoption or the loss of
their trade.
89. F. T. C. v. M. G. Slocum, 4 F. T. C. 155 (1921).
90. Carter Carburetor Corp. v. F. T. C., 112 F. 2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940).
91. F. T. C. v. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U. S. 304 (1934).
92. Id., at 312.
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f. Exclusive contracts.
Last term the Supreme Court decided a case which reiterated
the broad scope of the Federal Trade Commission Act. This Mo-
tion Picture Advertising Service case98 involved a company engaged
in the production and distribution of advertising motion pictures
which depict and describe commodities offered for sale. This
company entered into five-year contracts with theatre owners; in
many instances the contracts provided that the theatre owner would
show only those advertising films supplied by that company. The
Supreme Court sustained the Federal Trade Commission's contention
that exclusive contracts for a greater period of time than one year
had, in this case, a tendency to restrain competition and to develop a
monopoly which, if allowed to proceed unchecked, would ultimately
result in violation of the Sherman Act. The significant factor to
be kept in mind, however, is that the practice here found violative
of the Federal Trade Commission Act was not necessarily one which
would also violate the section of the Clayton Act dealing with ex-
clusive contracts, Section 3. Thus the Court states that the
94
• .. Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supple-
ment and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act .. .
- to stop in their incipiency acts and practices which, when
full blown, would violate those Acts . . . . as well as to con-
demn as 'unfair methods of competition' e-'isting violations of
them.
E. Patents.
The patent laws were enacted pursuant to constitutional authoriza-
tion contained in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which pro-
vides that the Congress shall have power "to promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and dis-
coveries." Consistent with this Constitutional authorization, a patent
system was formulated which has stood practically unchanged for
over one hundred years.95 The heart of that system is a grant to
inventors and discoverers "for the term of seventeen years, of the
exclusive right to make, use, and vend the invention or discovery
. . . throughout the United States and the Territories thereof." 96
In other words, the patent laws grant a 17-year monopoly to the
inventor of the thing he has invented. The purpose of these laws,
93. F. T. C. v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U. S. 392 (1952).
94. Id., at 394.
95. Robinson, Tian LAW OF PATENTS, Vol. 1, § 49, p. 81 (1890).
96. 35 U. S. C. 40, et seq.
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as the Constitutional provision indicates, is to reward inventors for
their contributions, stimulate them to further efforts and encourage
them to incur the commercial risk that may be necessary if the public
is to obtain the benefit of their contributions.97
1. Price-fixing. •
An undoubted reason for the increase in the number of antitrust
cases involving patents during the past decade, is that investigations
have revealed a number of instances where patents were being used
as colorable sanctions for monopolistic practices beyond the legal
rights derived from the ownership of such patents. The misuse of pa-
tents as the new fashion for cloaking restraint and monopoly appears
to have been in part, at least, the indirect result of two decisions of
the Supreme Court- the General Electric decision, 98 in 1926, and
the Trenton Potteries decision,9 9 in 1927. The General Electric de-
cision held that a patentee-manufacturer could legally license another
to make and sell the patented product at fixed prices and under other
terms of sale agreed to by the licensor-licensee. The Court, in the
Trenton Potteries decision, held that price-fixing arrangements re-
lating to unpatented articles were wholly unreasonable and unlawful.
While the Trenton doctrine was not new, the decision served as a
reminder that the old-fashioned, crude method of agreeing upon
prices was clearly a dangerous practice. A more subtle means of
accomplishing the same result was needed. Thus, in an attempt to
avoid the strict prohibitions against price-fixing, some members in
industry began more and more to lean on the doctrine of the General
Electric decision as a device for achieving price uniformity and
avoiding price competition. Patent licensing arrangements, many of
which stabilized prices in entire industries, followed. Of course,
all such arrangements were not illegal, but as shown by the court
decisions handed down during the period from 1939 to date, the
theory of the General Electric decision was, in at least some instances,
distorted beyond recognition.' 0 0
2. Tie-in Problems.
It is a well-settled rule that a patentee may not grant a license
upon the condition that the licensee purchase materials used with
the patented article, or as a part of the patented combination, from
97. Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U. S. 322, 328 (1859); Woodbridge v. United
States, 263 U. S. 50 (1923).
98. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476 (1926).
99. United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U. S. 392 (1927).
100. Hartford-Empire v. United States, 323 U. S. 386 (1945) ; United States
v. Line Material Co., 333 U. S. 287 (1948); United States v. U. S. Gypsum
Co., 333 U. S. 364 (1948).
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the patentee himself. Justice Douglas, in his dissent in the Hazeltine
decision stated:101
• . . One who holds a patent on article A may not license the
use of the patent on condition that B, an unpatented article, be
bought. Such a contract or agreement would be an extension
of the grant of the patent, contrary to a long line of decisions.
(Citing several cases). For it would sweep under the patent
an article that is unpatented or unpatentable. Each patent
owner would become his own patent office and, by reason of
the leverage of the patent, obtain a larger monopoly of the
market than the Constitution or statutes permit.
A majority of the Court agreed with Justice Douglas' statement
of the rule. The majority held, however, that a license agreement,
under which the licensee paid a royalty based on a percentage of
its total sales in certain lines without regard to whether or not the
product sold was patented or unpatented, was not contrary to the
rule. Justice Douglas and Black dissented, taking the position that
the basing of the royalty upon total sales resulted in the patent
owner using "... the patent to bludgeon his way into a partnership
with this licensee, collecting royalties on unpatented as well as pat-
ented articles."
Despite the Hazeltine decision, it is suggested that this is still a
safe proposition to follow-a patent should not be used in such a
manner as to extend monopoly control over products not covered
by the patent as such. In the first place, the majority was careful
to distinguish certain cases 102 standing for the traditional doctrine
in "tie-in" cases. And, in the second place, the Court laid consider-
able emphasis upon the fact that the royalty provision was ". . . a
convenient mode of operation designed by the parties to avoid the
necessity of determining whether each type of petitioner's products
embodies any of the numerous Hazeltine patents."
3. Grant-back Provisions.
One of the liveliest questions that has arisen relates to grant-back
provisions whereby a patentee compels the assignment back to him
of improvement patents developed by his licensee. This would be a
logical place to discuss that problem since the tying clause doctrine
is, at least in part, applicable.
101. Automatic Radio Co. v. Hazeltine, 339 U. S. 827, 837 (1950).
102. United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 389, 400 (1948);
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U. S. 661, 665-666 (1944);
Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488, 778 (1942).
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In the Transparent Wrap case,103 Judge Learned Hand used the
rule of the tying clause to hold that the patentee could not compel
the licensee to give a grant-back provision. The Supreme Court,
however, in a five to three decision, 104 reversed this holding and held
that such a condition was not illegal per se. It did make it clear, how-
ever, that any such transaction would be illegal if the effect of the
requirement was to restrain trade or create a monopoly within the
ban of the antitrust law. Consistently, the Court referred the case
back for determination of the effect of the requirement under the
antitrust laws.
In two subsequent cases,105 both of them antitrust cases, District
Courts have held that the doctrine of the Transparent Wrap case
was no defense against similar practices where it appeared that the
effect of the grant-back clause was to lessen competition in violation
of the antitrust laws.
4. Patent Pools.
Many patents are relatively narrow in scope, others overlapping
still other patents. There may be a dominant subservient relation-
ship between patents in which no invention can be used to the best
advantage unless there is access to the other inventions. Where
these situations exist, a patent pooling arrangement whereby two or
more members of an industry throw their patents into a common
pot and make them available to each other, may be desirable. Where
the objectives of such a pool is to give the public the benefit of the
latest technology, there would seem to be no objection to it under
the antitrust laws. The decision in the Standard Oil case106 holds
that a pool of the oil-cracking patents was not illegal on the facts
of that case. An unrestricted pool is in accord with the antitrust
laws and may substantially further competition.
The situation is quite different, however, where restrictions are
imposed upon the participants of the pool. If these restrictions should,
for example, exclude certain members of the industry from the pool,
then there would appear to be no doubt that the arrangement is
illegal. It is one thing to have an "open"' pool and another thing
to have a "closed" pool. If the pooling arrangement is being used
for the purpose of imposing quantity, price or quality restrictions, or
103. Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent Wrap Machine Corp., 156 F. 2d
198 (2nd Cir. 1946).
104. Transparent Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U. S.
637 (1947).
105. United States v. General Electric Co., 80 F. Supp. 989, 1005, 1006
(S. D. N. Y. 1948); United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753,
815-816 (D. C. N. J. 1949).
106. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 163 (1931).
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territorial allocations, this, too, would be illegal. In support of this
there may be cited the old "bathtub" case, 107 decided in 1912, in
which such activities were held to be illegal under the antitrust laws.
In that case, justice McKenna stated :108
Rights conferred by patents are indeed very definite and ex-
tensive, but they do not give any more than other rights an
universal license against positive prohibitions. The Sherman law
is a limitation of rights, rights which may be pushed to evil con-
sequences and therefore restrained.
There are, of course, other evils which may crop up in pooling
arrangements. There shall be mentioned only two:
a. Where there is the establishment of a common litigation fund
and concerted action and effort by the participants to enforce the
pooled patents against outsiders then the arrangement is dangerous-
ly close to a violation of the antitrust laws. By putting up a "common
front" to the remainder of the industry and making a demonstration
of great financial strength the pool is in position to coerce weaker
concerns. Because of the high cost of patent infringement litigation
the individual concern is at a decided disadvantage in fighting the
combined strength of the pool. Quite often the individual concern
abandons the struggle with the pool even though it may have a meri-
torious position.
b. If the participants represent a substantial part of industry and
if they agree not to compete with each other in the acquisition of
patents from outsiders- again the pool is getting dangerously close
to a violation. A combination not to compete in the acquisition of
patents is the same in principle as a combination not to compete in
the purchase of tobacco.10 9
judge Picard's decision in the Besser case 1 0 discusses the prob-
lems relating to concerted efforts to enforce patents and patent rights.
5. Allocation of Fields and Territories.
In the early days, when the inventor exploited his self-contained
invention there was very little, if any, problem since it is clear that
the patent laws gave him a 17-year monopoly of the invention. Gener-
ally, his sphere of activity was in a relatively narrow area. Today,
commercial organizations operate in an ever widening area of trade.
This has resulted in these organizations coming in conflict with
107. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20 (1912).
108. Id., at 49.
109. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781 (1946).
110. Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U. S. 444 (1952).
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similar organizations in the same area of trade. Frequently patent
arrangements have resulted whereby two or more competitors ar-
range their patent rights in such a manner that one attains the
rights of all for a certain geographical territory or for a certain field
of use, another obtains the rights of all for another territory or
field, and so on. With the expansion of international trade, the
areas covered by these arrangements have expanded. Indeed, ar-
rangements of this kind are not infrequently international in scope
as shown by the recent decision in the Imperial Chemical Industries
case 1 and in the Lead case.
112
F. Monopoly.
The Standard Oil case,113 is the landmark decision in the con-
struction of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Prior to the adoption
of the Sherman Act, a number of the dominating oil companies of
the country had combined, first, by means of a trust device and later
through Standard Oil of New Jersey, a holding company. The Su-
preme Court's decision that the combination had unreasonably re-
strained and monopolized interstate commerce was based on the
following circumstances: (1) the dominating power and control
over the oil industry which the combination had attained, and (2) the
intent, manifested by its acts, to secure and maintain this mastery
by excluding others from the field. Since the combination had been
formed prior to the passage of the Sherman Act, the effect of the
decision was that the mere continued existence of the combination,
in view of the purpose for which it had been formed and the manner
in which it had executed its power, constituted a violation of Sec-
tion 2.
In 1911, the Government sought to dissolve U. S. Steel which
had been organized in 1901 to acquire and hold the stock of twelve
independent operating companies. However, during the period be-
tween its organization and the filing of the suit, the company's share
of the market had decreased from 50 per cent to about 41 per cent
and the business of certain competitors had grown at a rate more
rapid than that of the defendant. The Supreme Court in a 4-3 de-
cision 1 4 affirmed the dismissal of the complaint by the lower court 15
finding that the corporation had not engaged in predatory practices,
111. United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 100 F. Supp. 504 (S. D.
N. Y. 1951).
112. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U. S. 319 (1947).
113. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911).
114. United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920).
115. United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., 223 Fed. 55 (3rd Cir. 1915).
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had not attempted to oppress competitors, had encountered substan-
tial competition, and had abandoned certain price-fixing agreements
before the suit was filed. In view of these facts, the Supreme
Court concluded that the defendant had neither the purpose nor the
power to control prices and that even though U. S. Steel was of
impressive size, size alone did not constitute a violation of the Sher-
man Act.
Again in the International Harvester Co. case,1 16 the Supreme
Court held that control over 64 per cent of the market did not, when
unaccompanied by otherwise unlawful conduct, establish a violation
of the Sherman Act. Again, as in the Steel case, the Court found
that the defendants had not endeavored to drive competitors out of
business, that substantial competition remained, and that defendant's
share of the market had decreased from 77 per cent to 64 per cent
during the period of the litigation. The Court again announced the
doctrine that "mere size" or "unexerted power" is not sufficient to
constitute a monopolization unless competitors have been excluded
or unless there is shown a specific intent to acquire monopoly control.
In view of these two last mentioned adverse decisions there was
considerable doubt as to the utility of Section 2 of the Sherman Act
in preventing or retarding the growth of monopolies. However, the
section was revivified by the case against Aluminum Company of
America.11 7 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acting
as a special court in place of the Supreme Court which could not
muster a quorum, in an opinion by judge Learned Hand, held that
the Aluminum Company of America had been guilty of monopoliza-
tion in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the manufac-
ture of virgin aluminum in the United States. Judge Hand, in his
opinion, did not rest his judgment on the corporation's coercive or
immoral practices. Instead, he found that Alcoa acquired by its
voluntary actions 90 per cent of the domestic market. The Court
concluded that an enterprise has "monopolized" if, regardless of its
intent, it has achieved a monopoly by manoeuvres which, though
"honestly industrial," were not economically inevitable, but were
rather the result of the firm's free choice of business policies. judge
Hand referred to the economic purpose of the Sherman Act in these
words :118
Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic
116. United States v. International Harvester, 274 U. S. 693 (1927).
117. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (6th
Cir. 1945).
118. Id., at 427.
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power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses ener-
gy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry
is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant
stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let
well enough alone.
And he referred to the social purpose as follows :119
It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect,
to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his
success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the
great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few.
Both the technique and the language of Judge Hand were express-
ly approved in the American Tobacco Co. case.120 Comparable
principles were applied in the Griffith, Schine and Paramount thea-
tre cases.12 1 The Griffith case named as defendants four theatre
chains and ten major motion picture distributing companies alleg-
ing a monopoly of the exhibition of motion pictures in three south-
western states through the negotiation of blanket contracts between
the exhibitor and distributor defendants for the exhibition of all de-
sirable pictures, as a result of which competing independent exhibi-
tors were precluded from an opportunity to obtain the best pictures.
The Supreme Court in reversing the judgment of a lower court in
favor of the defendants held that to prove a violation of Section 2
it was not always necessary to show a violation of Section 1 and
the Court concluded that an enterprise had monopolized in violation
of Section 2 if it (a) had the power to exclude competition, and
(b) had exercised it, or had the purpose to exercise it.
In the American Tobacco case, where three principal producers
of cigarettes were convicted of conspiring to monopolize commerce
in leaf tobacco and tobacco products by fixing prices at which they
would purchase leaf tobacco and would sell tobacco products, the
Supreme Court held that actual exclusion of competitors is not a
necessary ingredient of the offense of monopolization. The Supreme
Court stated that the material consideration "is not that prices are
raised and that competition actually is excluded but that power exists
to raise prices or to exclude competition when it is desired to do so."
It quoted with approval from Judge Hand's opinion in Alcoa and
119. Ibid.
120. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781 (1946).
121. United States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100 (1948) ; Schine Chain Theatres,
Inc. v. United States, 334 U. S. 110 (1948) ; United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131 (1948).
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stated that the power to exclude competitors coupled with a purpose
to use that power where necessary constituted the essential ingredi-
ent of the offense.
III. CLAYTON AcT
A. Lease or Sale Agreement Not To Use Goods of a Competitor of
the Lessor or Seller.
Section 3 of the Clayton Act is a more specific, and in certain re-
spects a more limited, statute than the Sherman Act. It provides
that no person engaged in commerce, in the course of that commerce,
shall sell or lease, or contract to sell or lease goods, wares, mer-
chandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities, on the condition
that the buyer or lessee shall not use or deal in the goods of a com-
petitor of the seller or lessor, where the effect thereof "may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce."
It has been said that the test of illegality under the Clayton Act
is less stringent than that under the Sherman Act. This difference,
it is suggested, lies primarily in the fact that the Clayton Act is de-
signed to reach restraints and monopolization in their incipiency,
before they have developed to a point where they can be reached,
under the Sherman Act.
The words of the Clayton Act "Where the effect of such contracts
. may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly" have been interpreted to mean "probability" and not
"mere possibility." However, in determining whether the probable
effect of a given contract or series of contracts will be to substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, the courts
have used some of the tests used in determining whether a given re-
straint violates the Sherman Act. Market dominance and monopoly
power, or other economic power to force buyers to accept exclusive
dealing arrangements, are of significance in Clayton Act as well as
Sherman Act cases.
The two most important types of exclusive dealing arrangements
which fall within the applicable scope of the Clayton Act are tie-in
sales and requirements contracts.
1. Application to Tie-in Leases or Sales.
A tie-in sale is a form of arrangement in which the seller usually
possesses some distinct advantage over competitors with respect to
a particular commodity, and he requires the buyer, in order to se-
cure that commodity, to agree to purchase from the seller other com-
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modities, thus extending to them the seller's advantage in the tying
commodity. Illustrations of common tie-in sales are the sale or
lease of a patented machine or product, with agreement by the buyer
to use with that machine or product only those goods which he pur-
chases from the seller or lessor of the machine; or a contract for the
sale of a commodity in short supply, which the seller possesses but
which competing concerns may not have, upon the condition that
the buyer will purchase other goods from the seller. The Supreme
Court has said that "tie-in agreements serve hardly any purpose be-
yond the suppression of competition."
For example, in the United Shoe Machinery case 122 the Supreme
Court sustained a decree enjoining the use of restrictive clauses in
leases as violations of the Clayton Act. These clauses included a
provision that if the lessee failed to use exclusively machinery of
certain kinds made by the lessor, the latter would have the "right to
cancel the leasing arrangement.
A similar situation was presented in the International Business
Machines Corp. case,12 3 where IBM, the lessor of tabulating machines,
licensed the use of such equipment upon the condition that the lessee
operate only with cards supplied by the lessor. The Court concluded
that the effect of these leases was to substantially lessen competi-
tion, and refused to allow the defendants to introduce the good will
of the manufacturer as a justification for the practice.
A most recent example is the International Salt Co. case,12 4 where
the defendant had a patent monopoly on certain types of salt dispens-
ing machines. It leased these machines on the condition that the
lessee purchase from the lessor all salt tablets to be used in the ma-
chines. The Supreme Court held that this lease agreement extended
the lawful monopoly which defendant had over the machines to an
unlawful monopoly over the unpatented salt tablets used therein.
Although the dollar volume of sales of salt involved in this arrange-
ment was only a half million dollars, and probably amounted to only
a small percentage of the total national sales of salt, the Supreme
Court held that this extension of a patent monopoly to unpatented
products was an unreasonable restraint in itself, and that since the
amount of commerce involved was substantial, the defendant's per-
centage of total industry sales of salt was irrelevant.
122. United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States, 258 U. S. 451 (1922).
123. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U. S. 131
(1936).
124. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947).
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2. Application to Exclusive Arrangements and Requirement Con-
tracts.
Aside from tie-in sales or leases, a contract between a seller and a
single buyer who represents a substantial part of the total market,
or a series of contracts with buyers who represent a substantial part
of the market, whereby the buyers agree to purchase their full require-
ments of a specified commodity from the seller would also fall with-
in the ambit of the Clayton Act. Contracts for the purchase of a
specified quantity of goods would have practically the same effect if
the quantity which is specified is sufficiently large to meet all exist-
ing and anticipated requirements of the buyers for a considerable
period of time. Requirements contracts which are terminable by
the buyer, or which do not extend for an undue or unreasonable
length of time would not be as likely to unreasonably restrain trade
or to substantially lessen competition.
The Fashion Originator Guild case125 involved the validity of re-
quirements contracts under the Clayton Act. The Guild was com-
posed of 176 garment manufacturers, who occupied a commanding
position in their line of business. The Guild sold 38 per cent of
the women's dresses wholesaling at $6.75 and 60 per cent of those
at $10.75. The Guild adopted a system of sale under which textiles
would be sold to garment manufacturers only upon the condition
that the buyers would not use or deal in textiles which are copied
from the designs of Guild members, and under which garment manu-
facturers would sell to retailers only on the condition that the retailers
would not handle such copied designs. The Court rejected the argu-
ment that the use of requirements contracts was a necessary measure
of protection against the evils growing from the pirating of original
designs, and concluded that the power of the combination and the
coercion it exercised upon others brought the practices within the
condemnation of the Clayton Act.
In the Standard Oil Co. case, 126 the defendant entered into exclu-
sive dealing contracts with about 6,000 independent service station
operators. This was about 16 per cent of total outlets and they
handled about $66,000,000 worth of petroleum products and automo-
tive accessories, representing about 7 per cent of gasoline, 5 per cent
of lubricating oil, 2 per cent of tires and 2 per cent of storage bat-
teries sold in the geographical area involved. Under these contracts,
the dealer's undertaking was to purchase from Standard all of his
125. Fashion Originators Guild, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 312
U. S. 457 (1941).
126. Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U. S. 293 (1949).
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requirements of one or more products. The District Court in the
Standard Oil case12 7 held that the exclusive dealing contracts in
issue constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of
both the Sherman and Clayton Acts, since the intended effect was to
deny dealers access to competitors' products and deny suppliers
access to a substantial number of potential outlets for their products.
The District Court concluded that the number of outlets foreclosed
and the volume of business affected by the agreements were substan-
tial whether considered comparatively or not. The Supreme Court,
on review, sustained the decree under the Clayton Act, but did not
consider whether it might also be sustained under the Sherman Act.
B. Acquisition by One Corporation of the Stock or Assets of An-
other Corporation.
The Clayton Act as enacted in 1914 was drafted with the purpose
of making more definite the illegal practices covered generally by
the Sherman Act, and Section 7 specifically prohibited certain types
of corporate mergers and acquisitions. As originally drafted, Sec-
tion 7 prohibited the acquisition by one corporation of the corporate
stock of another corporation where the effect of such acquisition
may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporations
involved in any section or community or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce. By this Section the Congress sought to
discourage the merger process by curbing two of the easiest methods
by which companies could combine, i. e., (1) by stock acquisition,
and (2) by holding company control of competing corporations.
The judicial interpretation of Section 7, as originally enacted, de-
prived that provision of most of its intended effect. In the Interna-
tional Shoe Company case,128 involving a merger of the two largest
shoe manufacturing companies in the country, Section 7 was held to
be applicable only if (1) the combining corporations had been in
substantial competition with each other prior to their union, and
(2) if it were shown that competition in the industry at large had
been substantially lessened. In this case the Court found that be-
cause of the types of shoes manufactured and the areas in which
they were distributed by the respective merging companies, competi-
tion in the industry as a whole had not been lessened since the com-
panies were not found to have been in substantial competition with
each other prior to their union.
127. United States v. Standard Oil of California, 78 F. Supp. 850 (S. D.
Calif. 1948).
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In Thatcher Manufacturing Co. case12 9 and in the Swift case, 130
it was held that the Federal Trade Commission was ousted of juris-
diction if the acquiring company exchanged the acquired stock for
the assets of the acquired company before a cease and desist order
of the Commission could be issued. Moreover, the terms of that
Section, limited as they were to stock acquisitions, provided an op-
portunity of evasion by resort to the device of asset acquisition. These
statutory deficiencies, coupled with the increase in corporate mergers
and acquisitions that followed World War II, prompted the Congress
in December 1950 to amend Section 7 by the enactment of Public
Law 899,131 81st Congress.
Basically this amendment changed Section 7 so as to prohibit
the acquisition of the assets as well as the stock of a corporation
where such acquisition may result in a substantial lessening of com-
petition or a tendency to create a monopoly. As presently drafted,
this Section does not require that the merging corporations be com-
petitors in order for its prohibitions to apply. Moreover, the House
and Senate Reports accompanying Public Law 899 make it clear
that this amendment is more than a re-enactment of Sherman Act
prohibitions.
In the recent case of Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co.,13 2
in the Second Circuit, the first case of significance to reach an Ap-
pellate Court under the amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act, there
is afforded the first opportunity of having the benefit of judicial
interpretation of this Section. In this case, Hamilton filed a com-
plaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Connecticut, alleging a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act
by Benrus Watch Company in purchasing a large block of the vot-
ing stock of Hamilton, a competitor in the manufacture and sale of
watches. The complaint further alleged that should Benrus succeed
in achieving control over Hamilton, it would control such a signifi-
cant portion of the watch industry as to substantially lessen compe-
tition in that line of commerce. The complaint prayed, among other
things, that Benrus be required to divest itself of its Hamilton stock,
restrained from acquiring additional Hamilton stock, and that pend-
ing final disposition of the suit, a preliminary injunction issue enjoin-
ing Benrus from voting its Hamilton shares. District Court Judge
Hincks made findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered an
order enjoining Benrus, pending a trial and a final order, from vot-
129. Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 272 U. S. 554 (1926).
130. Swift & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 272 U. S. 554 (1926).
131. 15 U. S. C. §§ 18, 21.
132. Hamilton Watch v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F. 2d 738 (2nd Cir. 1953).
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ing such Hamilton stock. Benrus appealed from this order to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Circuit
Court Judge Frank, speaking for the Court, affirmed the District
Court in an opinion dated June 30, 1953, and stated :133
Defendant argues that it appears unmistakably that defendant
did not violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Were that true,
we would now know that plaintiff could have no final relief,
and that therefore the granting of the preliminary injunction
was an obvious error; indeed, we might direct dismissal of the
complaint. But we think that the present record sufficiently
discloses that the court, after a trial, may be required to conclude
that Benrus was not innocent of a Section 7 violation. * * *
*. * *
Nor, on the basis of [the District Court's] findings, can we
hold that the judge erred in temporarily holding, in effect, as
follows: (a) The acquisition of control of Hamilton by Benrus
very probably would substantially lessen competition in "a line
of commerce" within the meaning of Section 7. (b) The pur-
chases by Benrus of Hamilton shares were not made "solely for
investment" but for the primary purpose of obtaining such con-
trol; had this purpose not been frustrated by action of Hamil-
ton's management, Benrus would successfully have carried it
out. (c) Those purchases therefore violated Section 7. (d)
Purchases thus unlawfully made do not cease to be unlawful -
so as to preclude an order of divestment- because the purpose
is balked.
Although we now indulge in no ultimate conclusion, we be-
lieve the amendment of Section 7 in 1950 certainly casts doubt
on decisions -including International Shoe Co. v. F.T.C., 280
U. S. 291, and United States v. Cohmbia Steel Co., 334 U. S.
495 - interpreting that section as it stood previously. The Sen-
ate Committee Report stated that the intent of the amendment
was "to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency
and well before they had attained such effects as would justify
a Sherman Act proceeding." Interference at an early stage,
if possible, seems the paramount aim.
On October 9, 1953, Benrus consented in the District Court to
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shares of Hamilton stock, from soliciting proxies for stockholders
meetings, and from acquiring more Hamilton stock.
C. Interlocking Directorates.
Section 8 of the Clayton Act, in its pertinent provisions, provides:
. . . no person at the same time shall be a director in any two
or more corporations, any one of which has capital, surplus,
and undivided profits aggregating more than $1,000,000, en-
gaged in whole or in part in commerce .... if such corporations
are or shall have been theretofore, by virtue of their business
and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination
of competition by agreement between them would constitute a
violation of any of the provisions of any of the antitrust laws.
Except for the unreported decision of the District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio in the Mather case,18 4 in February 1935,
Section 8 had not been interpreted by the courts until this year. The
decision in this case did not go to the merits since the directors in-
volved resigned from at least one of the companies involved in each
of their dual directorships subsequent to the Government's complaint
and the Court dismissed the complaint as moot.
In the Sears, Roebuck case, 185 the Government charged that Sears
and the B. F. Goodrich Company competed in the retail sale of tires
and tubes and a variety of other products and that Sidney Weinberg
served as a director of both companies in violation of Section 8.
The relief sought by the Government included, inter alia, an order
declaring the dual directorship of Sidney J. Weinberg in both Sears
and Goodrich illegal and directing his resignation from one or both
corporate defendants.
The defendants admitted that Sears and Goodrich were competi-
tors in the sale of the above commodities in 97 communities through-
out the United States and that the approximate total annual dollar
volume of sales of the above items by Sears and Goodrich in these
communities was in excess of $65,000,000 and $16,000,000, respec-
tively. The Court, in granting the Government's motion for sum-
mary judgment found that Sears and Goodrich are competitors and
held that Section 8 forbids the defendant Weinberg to be a director
of both corporations at the same time.
The court stated that the basic issue presented for decision under
the admitted facts was whether Sears and Goodrich are "competitors,
134. United States v. William G. Mather (Ci. 5153, N. D. Ohio, 1936), un-
reported.
135. United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614 (1953).
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so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them
would constitute a violation of any of the provisions of any of the
antitrust laws."
IV. EX EMPTIONS.
The most important areas of exemption are labor, agricultural
cooperatives, transportation, exports, insurance, trade-marked goods
and patents. Trade-marked goods have already been considered in
connection with the Miller-Tydings Act and the McGuire Act. No
specific exemption has been granted as to patents, but a patent con-
fers certain monopolistic rights, and as we have seen, an improper
exercise of those rights is a violation of the antitrust laws.
A. Labor.
The courts early held that certain activities carried on by em-
ployees in an effort to improve their conditions of employment con-
stituted restraints upon employers and fell within the ambit of the
Sherman Act. An example of this was the effort of a union to
induce a hat manufacturer to unionize his factory. In order to
achieve this objective, the union imposed economic pressure upon
the manufacturer by urging its members not to purchase hats made
by the employer. In the course of an action against the union to
recover treble damages for violation of the Sherman Act brought by
the employer, the Supreme Court held' 36 that the boycott conducted
by the union was an illegal restraint of trade and that the employer
was entitled to recover from the union and its members three times
the amount of the damages he suffered.
As a result of this and similar holdings, Congress at the behest
of labor in passing the Clayton Act in 1914 incorporated in that
Act a Section 20 which provided, in effect, that the antitrust laws
were not applicable to a strike, boycott or peaceful picketing which
grows out of a dispute between employers and employees concern-
ing the terms or conditions of employment. However, this first labor
exemption was interpreted by the Supreme Court as covering only
the disputes between an employer and his immediate employees.
In 1932 Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act.' 3 7 This Act
specifically provided that the area of union activity which was to be
free from injunction was not to be restricted to an immediate em-
ployer-employee relation. Since this statute speaks in terms of limit-
ing the use of an injunction and does not refer to the Sherman Act,
there was no agreement as to what, if any, extent this legislation
136. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908).
137. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 101-115.
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placed labor unions outside of the scope of the Sherman Act. How-
ever, in the Hutcheson case, 138 the Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, held that whether union conduct
fell within the Sherman Act was to be determined by reading the
Sherman Act and Section 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act as a harmonizing text, with the latter two statutes
establishing the permissible bounds of union activities. Consequent-
ly, the Supreme Court held that restraints imposed upon an employer
as a result of a jurisdictional dispute between two unions were part
of a labor dispute that the Norris-LaGuardia Act had in effect placed
outside the scope of the Sherman Act. The practical effect of this
decision was to insulate labor unions from the Sherman Act to the
extent the acts were committed in the course of a labor dispute. The
big question mark left by this decision was what, if any, activities
of labor unions would be held by the courts not to be acts growing
out of a labor dispute and insulated from the Sherman Act. That
question, however, was not long in being answered. In the Allen
Bradley case,18 9 the Supreme Court stated that labor unions do vio-
late the Sherman Act when they aid and abet business groups in
imposing restraints which violate the Sherman Act, even though
the motive of the union in joining the business group is to further
interests of their members as wage earners. This holding was no
surprise in view of the reference to the Brims case in the Hutcheson
case. 1
40
It is thus seen that at the present time practically all activities of
organized labor fall within exemption from the antitrust laws except
the situation where a union combines with an employer or other
non-labor group to impose restraints of a kind which these laws
prohibit.
B. Agricultural Commodities.
In the case of products grown on the land, the output of any one
producer is ordinarily very small compared with the output of pro-
ducers of manufactured goods. This puts the grower at a disad-
vantage in marketing his product, which the Congress has sought to
remedy by various legislation. By the Capper-Volstead Act, 14 1
passed in 1922, Congress authorized growers of agricultural com-
modities to act together in processing and marketing their products,
providing certain requirements are met and this group activity is
138. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941).
139. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797 (1945).
140. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 232, fn. 3 (1941).
141. Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U. S. C. §§ 291, 292.
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done through the medium of an association operated for the mutual
benefit of its producer members. The law permits such associations
to have "marketing agencies in common" and they may make such
"contracts and agreements" as are necessary to effect their authorized
purposes. The law further provides that the Secretary of Agricul-
ture may issue a corrective order if he finds that any association is
monopolizing or restraining trade to such an extent that the price
of any agricultural commodity is "unduly enhanced".
When a producer's cooperative itself processes and markets, it is
within the authority given by this legislation and is free from the
prohibitions of the antitrust laws. However, if the cooperative mar-
kets by selling the produce which it handles to private corporations,
and joins with the latter in an agreement fixing the price at which the
corporations resell to consumers, such action goes beyond the immuni-
ty which the statute gives and is subject to the antitrust laws. The
Cooperative Marketing Act of 1926142 further extended the permis-
sible limits of cooperative activity among producers of agricultural
products and the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937143
permits the Secretary of Agriculture to issue orders regulating the
marketing of certain agricultural products. Such orders may regulate
the price to be paid to producers by processors of the product. Such
orders, however, may be issued only after hearings and findings and
only if the issuance of the order is approved by a stated percentage of
the producers. The statute provides that compliance with the pro-
visions of such a marketing order is not a violation of the antitrust
laws. On the other hand, no immunity exists if, after such an order
has been terminated, the parties agree among themselves to continue
to observe the provisions of the terminated order.
C. Transportation.
Congress has provided for federal regulation of almost all aspects
of the business of transportation whether by railroad, motor carrier
or air. The various transportation statutes confer upon the regula-
tory agencies power to approve various types of transactions, such
as joint traffic arrangements or acquisitions of control of one carrier
by another, and provide that such approved transactions shall be
exempt from the antitrust laws.
Absent such administrative agency approval, the various trans-
portation statutes do not provide for any blanket antitrust exemp-
142. Cooperative Marketing Act, 7 U. S. C. §§ 451, 455.
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tion. The Interstate Commerce Act' 44 authorizes the Interstate
Commerce Commission to fix maximum rates, minimum rates or
specific rates. It has been held however that this Act contemplates
that the carriers shall act competitively in establishing rates or in
providing service, subject to the regulating agency's power to step
in and direct what shall be done. Thus if the railroads agree with
each other upon the rates which they will charge or the services which
they will perform, they violate the antitrust laws, unless there is a
specific statutory provision exempting such an agreement from the
antitrust laws. Because of the limited extent to which the railroads
are exempted from the antitrust laws, the Government, several years
ago, filed a complaint against a group of Western Railroads.145 The
Government's case was simply that since the Interstate Commerce
Act did not authorize carriers to agree on rates, any such action on
their part would fall well within the purview of the Sherman Act
which makes all price fixing agreements illegal per se. However,
before this case was decided, the railroads prevailed upon Congress
to pass the Reed-Bulwinkle Act,146 in 1948. This Act authorized
the Commission to approve, subject to certain conditions, agree-
ments by the railroads providing for joint discussion and action
upon rates to be charged and services to be rendered. The Com-
mission, however, is not authorized to approve such agreements
unless they preserve the freedom of any carrier to act independent-
ly if it so desires. The Act specifically provides that if any such
agreements are approved by the Commission, action taken thereunder
is exempt from the antitrust laws.
The antitrust laws are not only met with in the various transpor-
tation statutes in those instances where exemptions therefrom are
provided for. Their philosophy is frequently one of the factors which
the administrative body has to consider in making its determinations.
Thus in certain instances where the regulatory agency is required by
the statute to take such action as it may find to be in the public in-
terest, the maintenance of competition has been held on occasions to
be one of the factors that the Commission must consider in determin-
ing public interest, where competition may be affected by its approval
or disapproval of a proposed transaction.
A decision' 47 of the Supreme Court, recently handed down, pre-
144. 49 U. S. C. § 15.
145. United States v. Association of American Railroads, (Ci. 246, D. Neb.,
1944).
146. Reed-Bulwinkle Act, 49 U. S. C. § 5b.
147. Federal Communications Commission v. R. C. A. Communications, Inc.,
346 U. S. 86 (1953).
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sents an instance where the Federal Communications Commission
based its action principally on competition and the Supreme Court
held that this factor alone was not decisive. In this particular case
a company applied for a license to engage in transmitting messages
by radio to Holland and Portugal where another company was al-
ready operating under a license from the Commission. Although the
Commission found that the new operation would not bring better
service or lower rates in the radio communication field, it granted
the license on the ground that the national policy favored competi-
tion and that on that basis the license should be issued. The Supreme
Court however held that in this instance the Commission had erred
in regarding such national policy as decisive of the public interest,
to the exclusion of other relevant factors.
D. Exports.
The Webb-Pomerene Act,148 passed in 1918, provides that the
antitrust laws shall not apply to an association organized solely to
engage in export trade. Acts done by the association and agree-
ments made by it, in the course of export trade, are also given ex-
emption. The exemptions, however, do not include restraints of
trade within the United States or restraints upon the export trade
of any domestic competitor.
Under this Act, export associations are required to file informa-
tion as to their organization and membership with the Federal Trade
Commission, which may also call for additional information as to
the association's practices. The Commission is given the power to
conduct investigations to determine whether an export association
is staying within the limits of the Webb-Pomerene Act and it may
recommend to the association such changes as would enable it to
operate "in accordance with law". If these recommendations are
not complied with, the Commission is to refer the matter to the
Attorney General.
A number of years ago the Government brought a suit149 against
an export association and a number of its members charging viola-
tion of the Sherman Act and alleging that the association, by failure
to remain within the limitations of the Webb-Pomerene Act, had
lost its insulation from the antitrust laws. In this particular case
the defendants unsuccessfully urged that in view of the investigatory
power of the Federal Trade Commission, exclusive jurisdiction
rested in that agency to determine in the first instance whether an
148. Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 61, 65.
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export corporation was acting outside of the limitations established
by the Webb-Pomerene Act. The Supreme Court held that initial
action by the Commission to ascertain whether an association was
acting within the scope of the Webb-Pomerene Act is not a condition
precedent to a suit under the antitrust laws against an export asso-
ciation.
E. Insurance.
The business of insurance has also been given certain exemptions
from the antitrust laws. For a number of years it was thought that
the insurance business was not interstate commerce and therefore
could not be reached under the antitrust laws. However, on June
5, 1944 the Supreme Court decided the Southern Underwriters
case,150 in which it held that the business of making contracts of
insurance between persons residing in different states is a part of
the trade or commerce among the several states to which the anti-
trust laws apply. Following this decision Congress was not long in
passing legislation which conferred upon insurance companies a
broad exemption from the antitrust laws. This legislation is present-
ly contained in the Act of Congress, commonly known as the Mc-
Carran Act.15 1 This Act specifically provides that the Sherman
Act exemption contained therein is inapplicable to any agreement to
boycott, coerce or intimidate. However, it provides that otherwise
the antitrust laws shall be applicable to the business of insurance only
to the extent that such business is not regulated by state law. Since
practically all of the states have laws regulating the insurance busi-
ness, the antitrust laws presently apply only to a limited extent to
that business.
150. United States v. Southeastern Underwriters' Ass'n., 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
151. McCarran Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011, 1012.
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